reconsiDer: TIDBIT
This fascinating story sounds like it's from a Frederick
Forsyth novel. It has corrupt, drug-smuggling DEA agents, government cover-ups,
corrupt U.S. Customs officials, and all sorts of material worthy of a first rate
thriller... only this is real life. Was the DEA involved in the ill-fated Pan Am
flight 103 that crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988? Why is the DEA
regularly bringing drugs into the U.S. when there are already plenty of drugs
here with which they can do sting operations with? Are DEA activities
jeopardizing airline safety? Attorney and Yale Law School professor Steven B.
Duke takes the DEA to court.
from the San Antonio Business
Journal
Government's kingpin-sting tactic
may threaten airline safety
By Bill Conroy
The
airline industry has put its thrusters on full bore in an effort to
comply
with government demands to beef up security in the wake of the Sept.
11
terror attacks.
But the same government that is feverishly spinning new
legislation to
strengthen the airline industry's security web in the war on
terrorism may
also be the source of a major flaw in that safety network -
stemming from
efforts to wage another battle: the war on
drugs.
According to a Yale Law School professor, that flaw may have
already played a
role in the destruction of at least one commercial airliner
- which was blown
up in mid-air, resulting in the loss of hundreds of
lives.
The law professor, Steven B. Duke, has written to numerous federal
agencies
concerning this flaw as part of his efforts to prove the innocence
of one of
his clients. To date, his efforts have produced little more than
agency
finger-pointing and a cryptic picture of the shadowy world of
undercover law
enforcement.
The flaw being exposed by Duke relates to
a practice called "controlled
delivery." The practice is used by law
enforcement to snare high-ranking
members of drug trafficking organizations.
In such a delivery, a law
enforcement agency allows a shipment of drugs to be
transported from one
location to its destination, under close surveillance,
in an effort to catch
drug-syndicate kingpins with their hands in the cookie
jar.
In the case of Duke's client, Gaetano DiGirolamo, some 20 kilos (44
pounds)
of heroin were transported on commercial airlines from Pakistan to
New York
City in an alleged controlled delivery undertaken to advance a
major
undercover drug operation. Agents with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement
Administration (DEA) transported the heroin in December 1990 from
Pakistan to
Paris, via Air France; and then from Paris to New York City, via
the
now-defunct airline TWA.
The drugs were then purportedly used to
set up a series of stings, one
netting DiGirolamo, who was ultimately
convicted in 1994 of drug conspiracy
charges in federal court in New York and
is now serving a life sentence. Duke
has since taken on DiGirolamo's case -
filing a post-conviction petition
seeking to vacate the judgment against his
client.
In that petition, Duke alleges that the DEA agents were not
really
undertaking a controlled delivery, but in fact were smuggling the
drugs into
the country for their own corrupt purposes. Duke charges that
DiGirolamo was
the victim of a sting operation designed to cover up the
agents' illegal
activities.
The agents, of course, contend Duke's
allegations are false.
Dire impact
The twists and
turns of the ongoing legal case, though, are overshadowed by
the larger
security issues raised by the practice of controlled delivery.
Controlled
delivery may well be an effective law-enforcement tool in
combating drug
cartels, when all goes as planned. However, when the system
breaks down, or
is corrupted, the consequences can be serious, even deadly,
according to
Duke.
A letter written in December 1999 by Duke to Jane Garvey,
administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), elucidates those
concerns:
"The DEA agents who brought the heroin to this country were
allegedly linking
up Pakistani drug producers and American dealers, through
the assistance of
informers working both in Pakistan and the United States.
The drug dealers'
discovery that the distribution network had been
infiltrated by informers was
therefore an omnipresent possibility, which they
might choose to defend
against by blowing up the airplane. There is ample
precedent for drug
organizations planting bombs in airplanes occupied by
passengers who are
informants. In 1989, a commercial airliner headed for the
United States was
blown up in flight because the Medellin Cartel believed an
informant was
aboard. All 107 passengers and crew were killed. ..."
In
a June 8, 2000, letter to the FAA's chief counsel, Duke also contends
that
negligence in a U.S. government-sponsored drug-sting operation may have
led
to the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. The airliner exploded
over
Lockerbie, Scotland, snuffing out the lives of 259 people on board
and
another 11 people on the ground.
Although a Libyan intelligence
officer was subsequently convicted of the
bombing, Duke provided the FAA's
chief counsel with a 1991 news story from
the London Times and a copy of an
affidavit from a U.S. intelligence officer
that points to another potential
cause for the downing of Flight 103.
The intelligence officer, who was
assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) and stationed in the Middle
East in 1988, contends that Flight 103 was
being used as a "controlled"
flight as part of a DEA drug-sting operation.
The London Times story states
that the DIA agent believed the DEA operation
was compromised, allowing
terrorists to plant a bomb on Flight 103 through an
airport bag
switch.
The DEA claims it was not running a drug sting on the ill-fated
flight. A
spokesman for Pan Am, however, said the DEA's claim is "simply
false,"
according to the London Times story.
"In addition to the
drug-related bombing of the Colombian jetliner in 1989
... it now appears
that DEA's smuggling of drugs on another passenger
airplane may have
contributed to the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie," states
Duke in his letter to the FAA's chief counsel. "...
Perhaps the Congress can
be persuaded to rectify that deficiency. One may
hope that a tragedy is not
required to produce a recognition of the problem
in that
venue."
Out of control
Although the letter Duke
wrote to the FAA administrator argues hypothetically
from the assumption that
the DEA agents in DiGirolamo's case were telling the
truth about the
Pakistan-to-New York heroin shipment, Duke's real position in
his client's
case is quite the opposite. In fact, he asserts that the agents
were
essentially using the cover of a controlled delivery to facilitate their
own
illicit drug smuggling operation - further illustrating how the practice
can
be corrupted.
Duke points out that the agents transporting the heroin did
not find buyers
for the drugs until some five months after bringing the
contraband back to
New York. He adds that the agents involved in the
transport never pretended
to be anything other than federal agents - so they
weren't acting undercover.
And, he stresses, the agents never produced any
documentation to show that
the operation had been approved by DEA
headquarters or by the foreign
governments affected, despite claiming that
such approvals were in place.
Several former federal law enforcement
officials contacted by the Business
Journal also agree that what occurred in
the DiGirolamo case, as alleged by
Duke, does not appear to qualify as a
controlled delivery.
"A controlled delivery requires the coordination of
numerous affected
offices, such as U.S. Customs, the DEA and the U.S.
Attorney's Office
prosecuting the case," explains one former undercover
agent. "And there has
to be surveillance on it from start to finish, someone
eyeballing it all the
way - which makes the operations very expensive because
they involve a lot of
man hours. This operation (the one in the DiGirolamo
case) doesn't sound
normal; it's not the way it works."
Duke has made
efforts to discover if the Pakistan-to-New York heroin shipment
was
sanctioned by a government agency. Between 1997 and 2000, he wrote a
series
of letters to the FAA, the Department of Transportation and the U.S.
Customs
Service seeking information on their policies concerning
controlled
deliveries - and more specifically about their knowledge of the
heroin
transported by DEA agents from Pakistan to New York in December 1990
via
commercial airlines.
The Department of Transportation referred his
letter to the FAA, which
replied by informing Duke that the FAA "does not
have authority ... to
prohibit DEA from transporting narcotics on commercial
airlines. ..."
The U.S. Customs Service provided Duke with the following
reply:
"The specific incident you cite involved the international
controlled
delivery of 20 kilograms of heroin at the John F. Kennedy (JFK)
Airport on
Dec. 4, 1990. Our records indicate that while our agency provided
assistance
in facilitating that delivery through JFK, the entire operation
was initiated
and coordinated solely by the DEA. ..."
The response
from Customs does not indicate who within the federal
law-enforcement agency
facilitated the delivery. However, at that time,
Customs was dealing with
some issues itself in relation to its JFK
operations, according to former JFK
Customs agent Diane Kleiman - who claims
she was fired in 1999 after blowing
the whistle on alleged corrupt activity
on the part of Customs officials at
the New York City airport.
Kleiman's case has been accepted for
investigation by the U.S. Office of
Special Council (OSC), an independent
federal agency that is empowered to
investigate and prosecute cases of
alleged governmental misconduct and
mismanagement. In a letter Kleiman sent
to the OSC in July 2001, she alleges
that between 1989 and 1991, three
federal agents assigned to a drug unit at
JFK died under unusual
circumstances. Two died of heroin overdoses and one
committed suicide -
allegedly after stealing drugs from an evidence room.
Duke says he is
investigating whether there is any connection between the JFK
drug-unit
agents and the DEA agents involved in the DiGirolamo case, but adds
"we don't
have the connection yet."
"We do know that Customs at JFK 'facilitated'
the (alleged) smuggling by our
DEA agents and were aware of it," he adds.
"Whether they were corruptly
involved remains to be
determined."
Customs officials in New York failed to reply to the
Business Journal's query
about Kleiman's claims prior to the paper's
deadline.
In the dark
The Business Journal also
contacted the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Eastern District of New York in
Brooklyn to seek comment on the DiGirolamo
case and on its policies
concerning controlled deliveries. A spokesman for
the office declined to
comment.
The newspaper contacted DEA headquarters in Washington, D.C., as
well, posing
the same questions. Will Glaspy, a DEA agent and spokesman for
the agency,
says he cannot comment on the specifics of ongoing litigation,
such as the
DiGirolamo case. However, he provided the following general
comments
concerning international controlled deliveries involving commercial
airlines:
"Yes, there are procedures that allow for this type of
operation. ... We have
policies with checks and balances in place to make
sure everything operates
smoothly (with respect to potential dangers to
passengers)."
Glaspy adds that the DEA cannot operate unilaterally in a
foreign country, so
it would need to obtain approvals from any foreign
countries affected by an
international controlled delivery - such as France
and Pakistan in the case
of the delivery made in the DiGirolamo
case.
In addition, Glaspy stresses that "there are numerous people who
need to sign
off on the details of the operational plan (for a controlled
delivery) from
the beginning to the end. (DEA) Headquarters plays a big part
in that." He
adds that there are also procedures in place to assure that
agents
transporting the contraband do not steal drugs from the
shipment.
In terms of whether the airlines would be made aware of such an
operation:
"It is possible that the commercial airlines involved (in a
controlled
delivery) would be made aware, but it is also possible that they
would not be
aware," Glaspy explains. "It's done as the need dictates with
respect to the
security of the operation and the safety of the
agents."
That might explain why Air France stated in a March 9, 1998,
letter to Duke
that it had no record of having been notified by the DEA of
the 1990 shipment
of 20 kilos of heroin from Pakistan to Paris via Air
France.
"We are not permitting such a transportation on our lines," the
letter
states. "Should we learn that a quantity of drugs, heroin or other,
large or
small, is loaded on board one of our aircrafts, we would immediately
report
to the local police as well as our national authorities."
TWA,
which was the commercial carrier that was used by the DEA agents to move
the
heroin from Paris to New York City, sent a letter to Duke in January
1998
declining to comment on the incident.
TWA's assets have since
been acquired by Fort Worth-based American Airlines.
When asked about its
policy concerning controlled deliveries, American
Airlines spokesman John
Hotard provided the following reply:
"American Airlines often cooperates
with federal law enforcement agencies in
the fight against drug smuggling. We
have a vast network of our own security
agents throughout our route system to
ensure that American Airlines flights
are safe and secure. That said, we are
not aware of any illegal drugs ever
being placed on any of our aircraft by
federal law enforcement officers."
Risky
business
Although American Airlines may not be aware of such
activity, according to a
February 1999 affidavit submitted in the DiGirolamo
case by DEA agent Charles
Graham, international controlled deliveries of
illegal drugs are standard
fair for the DEA. Graham was assigned to the DEA's
Karachi, Pakistan,
resident office (KRO) from 1989 to 1993.
"It is
standard operating procedure for the DEA to transfer drugs seized by
the DEA
in Pakistan to the DEA in the United States for the purpose of
doing
controlled deliveries," Graham states in the affidavit. "In my
estimation,
during the course of my tenure at the KRO, DEA performed at least
30 such
controlled deliveries. Drugs have been transferred under those
circumstances
to a number of DEA offices, including those in Long Island,
Miami, Los
Angeles and Philadelphia."
These revelations take on an
even more ominous tone in the wake of Sept. 11
and with the rise of global
terrorism. Consider the fact that, according to
an analysis of public
records, of the 28 groups that were designated as
terrorist organizations by
the U.S. State Department as of Oct. 5, 2001, at
least 10 (including
al-Qaeda) have known ties to drug trafficking or drug
cartels.
In that
light, Duke's legal efforts reveal some startling information
concerning the
U.S. government's policy on controlled deliveries, including
the fact that
the airlines and passengers are often kept in the dark with
respect to these
undercover drug shipments.
Duke spells out his concerns with the practice
in his December 1999 letter to
FAA Administrator Garvey:
"When I first
learned of an agent's testimony that he brought multi-kilo
quantities of
heroin into this country on commercial flights, I concluded
that the agents
were probably using the cover of their jobs to smuggle drugs
for their own
private, corrupt purposes," Duke states in the letter. "I still
suspect that
was the case. The U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern
District of New York
contends, however, that such activities are a common
practice of the
DEA."
Duke goes on in the letter to question why the government is
importing more
drugs into the country - given the fact that there are already
plenty of
drugs in the United States that could be used for sting
operations.
"Since there can be no compelling law enforcement purpose for
bringing such
drugs into the country," Duke continues, "... something is
seriously awry in
the DEA that, among other things, threatens the lives of
innocent
airline
passengers."
___________________
SIDEBAR
Yale law professor's client contends
he was wrongly convicted
By Bill
Conroy
Gaetano DiGirolamo is no saint.
According
to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) records, DiGirolamo
is a "known
associate of the Cotroni organized crime family based in Canada,
and has an
extensive narcotics background."
And DiGirolamo has paid a price for his
career choice. He spent much of the
1980s (1984-1990) in federal prison in
Danbury, Conn.
So it should not be a big surprise to most people that he
again found himself
on the wrong end of the law in the early 1990s, shortly
after his release
from prison.
That run-in with the system - the DEA
specifically - led to his indictment in
1991 and conviction in 1994 on drug
conspiracy charges in U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New
York.
The conspiracy charges against DiGirolamo stemmed from a meeting he
arranged
between a DEA informant and another individual who eventually
purchased
heroin from the informant.
However, DiGirolamo claims he had
nothing to do with the drug deal. Despite
what people might assume about him,
he contends that he is not guilty of the
charges brought against him in 1991;
in fact, he claims he was framed by DEA
agents seeking to use his case as a
cover for their own illegal
drug-smuggling activities.
DiGirolamo
appealed his conviction, only to lose again in 1995. At that
point, Steven B.
Duke, a professor of law at Yale Law School in New Haven,
Conn., stepped in,
taking on DiGirolamo's case pro bono. In 1997, Duke filed
a post-conviction
petition with the federal court seeking to vacate
DiGirolamo's
conviction.
Among the claims raised in the post-conviction petition were
that DiGirolamo
was convicted "based upon perjury of three DEA agents" and
that his
court-appointed lawyer provided inadequate legal
representation.
"(The DEA agents) testified that they were involved in
importing drugs for
use in 'stings' against me and others when in truth and
in fact they were
doing so for their own personal, criminal enrichment,"
states DiGirolamo in
his post-conviction petition.
According to court
pleadings, the DEA agents transported 20 kilos (44 pounds)
of heroin from
Pakistan to New York City via commercial airlines in December
1990 allegedly
for the purpose of setting up undercover stings.
The petition goes on to
raise major doubts about the veracity of the DEA
agents' purported sting
against DiGirolamo - such as the fact that the
alleged heroin brought in from
Pakistan was never tested to assure it was the
same heroin used in the sting,
nor was the heroin ever produced at trial.
In addition, despite claims by
the DEA agents involved in transporting the
heroin that their operation had
been sanctioned by DEA headquarters in
Washington, D.C., as well as the
French and Pakistani governments, Duke says
those approvals were never
produced.
"Where are they?" Duke asks in a court filing. "Where are the
applications
for such approvals? Where is the evidence that any of these
approvals were
sought, much less obtained?"
Jan
connection
DiGirolamo and others were being targeted, according
to the testimony of DEA
agents, because they were believed to be distributors
for a major heroin
trafficking syndicate headed by a mysterious Pakistani
figure named Jan. The
20 kilos of heroin imported from Pakistan by the DEA
agents allegedly were
acquired through undercover purchases from the Jan
organization, legal
filings in the DiGirolamo case state.
From
the fall of 1991 to the summer of 1992, there were a total of nine
other
prosecutions that were related to the Jan syndicate sting. In each of
those
cases, the DEA agents tell the same story, according to court filings
made by
DiGirolamo's defense team.
Despite this fact, the court
filings claim, Jan and the drug syndicate being
targeted by the DEA operation
never figured out that repeated stings and
arrests were occurring - even
though the heroin involved in the nine
prosecutions adds up to 50 kilos, 30
kilos more than was provided by the Jan
organization.
"How could any
organization think it had any of the 20 kilograms of heroin to
sell after the
first few arrests?" Dukes states in a legal brief in the
DiGirolamo case.
"Moreover, Jan was an informant for the DEA."
Duke was even able to track
down a witness who claims to have purchased
heroin from individuals fitting
the description of the DEA agents in the
DiGirolamo case. The witness, who is
serving a life sentence on drug
conspiracy charges in a federal prison in
Pennsylvania, claims the drugs he
and his partner acquired in those deals in
Queens, N.Y. (some 40 ounces a
week at $6,000 an ounce) were in turn sold on
the streets of Philadelphia.
Duke has made numerous requests of
prosecutors in both Philadelphia and New
York for various records that would
help substantiate or disprove the claims
being made by the witness, but "all
those requests were ignored," he claims.
In a letter to the judge in
DiGirolamo's case, Duke alleges that the DEA
agents were, in reality, engaged
in their own smuggling operation "for the
purpose of selling the drugs and
using 'stings' as a cover for their
operation."
The DEA agents
characterized the claims raised by Duke as "untrue and
absurd," according to
court records.
The judge in the case also dismissed Duke's arguments,
contending instead
that DiGirolamo was convicted on overwhelming evidence
that he conspired to
possess heroin.
In addition, according to court
records, the judge found there was
insufficient evidence to support the claim
that the DEA agents were illegally
importing heroin for their own drug
trafficking operation. And even if those
allegations were true, the judge
reasoned, it would simply make DiGirolamo a
co-conspirator with the DEA
agents.
"In December 1999, (the judge) dismissed the entire case in one
of the most
bizarre opinions I have ever seen," Duke says. "... Essentially,
(the judge)
said it didn't matter if the DEA agents were corrupt
smugglers."
Duke says he currently has a dormant motion to reconsider the
ruling now
pending with the court, "which I intend to activate very soon.
..."
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