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FIGHTING "CHEECH & CHONG" MEDICINE
Did
The White House Drug Office Go Too Far In Trying To Stop The Spread Of
Medical Marijuana Initiatives?
July 27, 2000 - NEW YORK --
When voters in California and Arizona passed
ballot measures legalizing
medicinal marijuana in November 1996, White
House drug czar Gen. Barry R.
McCaffrey mobilized his troops to combat the
spread of what he had
previously called "Cheech & Chong" medicine.
McCaffrey quickly
proposed that doctors who "recommend or prescribe"
marijuana be stripped of
their DEA registration -- that is, their ability
to write prescriptions for
controlled substances -- and be excluded from
treating Medicare and Medicaid
patients. But a group of California doctors
and patient advocacy groups sued
to enjoin those restrictions, and a
federal judge agreed.
Now that
same lawsuit provides evidence of a more ambitious, but less
well-known,
effort by McCaffrey's Office of National Drug Control Policy to
stop the
spread of state initiatives legalizing medical marijuana -- an
effort that,
among other achievements, helped inspire the ONDCP's
controversial
taxpayer-funded, anti-drug media crusade.
The cooperation of the ONDCP
and its key ally, the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America, in the fight
against medical marijuana is a little known
chapter in the annals of the
nation's ongoing drug war. In the last few
years, drug warriors have
attempted to slow the spread of medicinal
marijuana initiatives, and, with
varying success, block their
implementation in states that passed them --
even as data about the
therapeutic uses of cannabinoids, the chemicals that
appear in marijuana,
to treat nausea and pain is increasingly well
documented. In fact, for
nearly 20 years, the federal government sought to
curb medical marijuana
research, and McCaffrey has been among the most
zealous bureaucrats on that
front.
But the documents uncovered by the
California lawsuit reveal the extent of
McCaffrey's role in spearheading the
political fight against medical
marijuana -- and in turn, the role played by
the pot initiatives in
strengthening the drug warriors' determination to
mount a paid media
campaign, at least in part to keep similar initiatives
from passing in
other states.
Within days of the California and
Arizona pot initiatives' passage, for
instance, McCaffrey convened a
high-level meeting of some 40 government and
private sector drug warriors to
plan a response to the medical marijuana
threat. At least one participant
knew at the time that the meeting --
convened by federal officials to
counter the will of state voters -- would
be controversial if word of it
ever became public.
"The other side would be salivating if they could
hear [the] prospect of
[the] Feds going against the will of the people,"
commented Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation vice president Dr. Paul S.
Jellinek, according to notes
of the meeting taken at the time and uncovered
by the California doctors'
lawsuit.
Daniel Porterfield, who is
currently vice president of communications for
Georgetown University,
attended the meeting as a deputy assistant secretary
in charge of
coordinating various anti-drug efforts within Health and Human
Services. He
told Salon, "The reason for the meeting was to organize the
effort for the
other 48 states."
One outcome of the meeting was a determination to step
up the media war
against drugs, which helped lead to ONDCP's paid media
campaign. Salon
revealed earlier this year that television networks, TV
producers and some
magazine publishers inserted anti-drug messages into
television shows and
nonfiction magazine articles in order to fulfill
ONDCP's requirement that
it get ads on a two-for-one, half-priced basis --
or that programming or
editorial content satisfy this
stipulation.
The White House drug office stumbled back into the headlines
a few weeks
ago, when McCaffrey told members of the House subcommittee on
Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources that his office plans to
expand
its media campaign to influence the content of movies, not just
television
and magazines. Elaborating on the plan and referring to potential
financial
credits for films with anti-drug motifs, ONDCP spokesman Bob
Weiner told
the Los Angeles Times, "But if the movies choose to do that,
they can
submit it to our contractors after the movie is completed for
review for
credit."
Meanwhile, ONDCP critics question whether the
federal agency or the
tax-exempt PDFA should have been seeking to influence
state elections at
all. "The use of government resources to politic on
controversial issues is
clearly against ethics, as well as the law stating
that federal employees
can not take public positions for or against
legislation under
consideration," insists Thomas H. Haines, head of the
Partnership for
Responsible Drug Information, a persistent McCaffrey
critic.
American Civil Liberties Union president Nadine Strossen believes
the
meeting convened by McCaffrey, which according to an attendance record
included no medical-use proponents, raises "at the very least a moral and
political question. It raises First Amendment-type concerns about the
nature of a free society, and what an open debate should be in a democratic
society."
McCaffrey declined to comment for this story, but Weiner
told Salon:
"Consistently throughout this process, Gen. McCaffrey has been
aware of the
[political] restrictions, and has honored them." Weiner
wouldn't comment
directly on the November 1996 ONDCP meeting. But when asked
about whether
the paid media campaign had the potential to create a national
political
climate inimical to the passage of medical marijuana initiatives,
he
responded, "If it has a peripheral effect, so be it."
Steve
Dnistrian, executive vice president of PDFA, also denied that the
National
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign was designed to combat medical
marijuana
legalization. "The NYADMC is focused on teens, pre-teens and
parents. No ads
or other pieces of communication have anything to do with
medical
marijuana," he said in an e-mail. Dnistrian told Salon that
discussions
about the paid media campaign began long before concerns about
medical
marijuana initiatives "were even on the radar."
But even some of those
invited to McCaffrey's November 1996 meeting now say
that there were
concerns about the political nature of the discussions, and
questions about
whether the campaign's organizers should be seeking to sway
public opinion
against medical marijuana initiatives.
It was Nov. 14, 1996, just nine
days after the passage of medical marijuana
initiatives in California and
Arizona, that McCaffrey convened the first
meeting at ONDCP's Washington
office. The attendees included then DEA
administrator Thomas A. Constantine
and three other DEA officials; seven
ONDCP staffers; and representatives of
the FBI as well as the U.S.
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Education and
Health and Human Services.
Also present were White House domestic policy
adviser Leanne Shimabukuro
and public liaison Christa Robinson, plus eight
senior executives from
private groups supportive of the drug war, including
the president of the
Partnership for a Drug-Free America.
With
overwhelming public support, the medical marijuana votes represented a
rebuke to the anti-drug mandate of McCaffrey's office. The initiative
passed in California by 56 percent and in Arizona by an astounding 65
percent. In 1998, District of Columbia voters approved their initiative by
69 percent, though no one knew of the landslide for a year because Congress
delayed counting the vote.
According to two separate versions of
meeting minutes obtained by Salon, as
well as interviews with several
participants, these government officials
and senior executives intended to
ensure that neither voters nor
legislators in the other 48 states would pass
similar medical use legislation.
The two sets of contemporaneous notes
surfaced as part of the discovery
process in the federal lawsuit Conant vs.
McCaffrey, currently under
adjudication in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of
California. The lawsuit was filed in response to Gen.
McCaffrey's formal
policy statement -- issued Dec. 30, 1996, at a press
conference attended by
Attorney General Janet Reno, Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna
Shalala and a DEA official -- in which he
threatened to revoke the federal
prescription-writing privileges of doctors
who recommended or prescribed
medical marijuana to their patients, bar them
from treating Medicare and
Medicaid patients and criminally prosecute them.
The plaintiffs were
granted a preliminary injunction; the next court date is
Aug. 3.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs provided Salon with copies of
documents the
federal government has made available to them as required by
the court in
the case's discovery process. Currently a senior trial attorney
at the
Justice Department, Wayne Raabe was a staff attorney for ONDCP in
November
1996. He confirmed his attendance at the meeting, and that he
authored one
set of the notes, but declined to comment further.
Some
participants in the ONDCP meeting believed that the medical marijuana
effort
veiled a broader movement that sought gradual full-scale
legalization of the
Schedule 1 controlled substance. According to the
notes, James E. Copple,
then president and CEO of the Community Anti-Drug
Coalition of America, told
his colleagues, "Need to frame the issue
properly -- expose this as
legalizers using terminally ill as props."
Maricopa County District Attorney
Richard Romley, who led the Arizona
delegation, stated that, "Even though
California and Arizona are different
prop[osition]s, the strategy of
proponents is the same. It will expand
throughout the nation if we all don't
react."
As summarized in the documents' clipped parlance, Copple also
told those
gathered at the meeting, "We'll work with Arizona and California
to undo it
and stop the spread of legalization to other 48 states.
Twenty-seven states
have the potential." He added, "Need to go state by
state. $ to do media."
And Orange County Sheriff Brad Gates, long a
prominent critic of medical
marijuana, is quoted as saying, "Legalizers are
going national. We need to
get organized quickly to counter the Americans
for Compassionate Use" -- a
pro-medical-use group.
In addition to
Copple's statement regarding media funding, comments from
two executives of
the private Partnership for a Drug-Free America suggest
that the meeting was
a major catalyst in replacing the nonprofit
advertising and media industry
umbrella group's then nearly decade-old,
donated-media public service
campaign with a taxpayer funded effort.(PDFA
is an unpaid consultant in
ONDCP's media campaign, and its name appears on
all of the campaign's
advertising.) As PDFA executive vice-president Mike
Townsend stated at the
meeting, "National Partnership [PDFA] concerned
about what they can do about
spending $ to influence legislation."
One attendee who asked not to be
identified said, "I recall a general
discussion of the media campaign, what
should and shouldn't be done."
PDFA president Richard Bonnette laid out
the challenge to the group. "We
lost Round I -- no coordinated communication
strategy. Didn't have media,"
the notes quote Bonnette telling his
colleagues. One participant not
clearly identified in the notes asked the
gathering, "Who will pay for
national sound bites? Campaign will require
serious media and serious $."
PDFA's Townsend suggested the group should
reach out to "California
parents" and, according to the notes, said the
effort required "$175
million. Try to get fedl $." In fact, that was the
amount backers of the
anti-drug media campaign first asked Congress for,
according to Rep. John
L. Mica, R-Fla., chair of the Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human
Resources subcommittee of the House Government Reform
Committee.
In a memo to his House colleagues, Mica wrote: "In 1996 and
1997, the PDFA
approached Congress for assistance. The PDFA worked with
Congress to fund
the President's budget request ($175 million) to replace
the decline in
donated media air time." Congress later bumped the first
year's
appropriation up to $195 million.
Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation prescient Dr. Jellinek worried aloud about
the political
implications of such a campaign. According to the notes, he
told the group:
"It is a political problem. You need a Federal response,
but [it] can't be
viewed as outside interference." Reached last week for
comment, Jellinek
said, "I don't have anything more to say. If you have the
quote, you have
the quote. Let it stand. Let it speak for itself." Fueled
significantly by
money derived from shares it holds in pharmaceutical and
healthcare giant
Johnson & Johnson, Jellinek's foundation contributed $15
million to the
PDFA in 1999 alone.
But PDFA's Townsend told Salon, "I never said
anything about that." PDFA
president Bonnette did not respond to multiple
requests for an interview.
During the meeting, attendees viewed
television commercials paid for during
the elections by proponents of the
medical marijuana initiatives. The notes
summarize the remarks of Orange
County Sheriff Gates as follows: "Money
made the diff. on [California's]
Prop 215. $2 million spent - advertising
campaign - Drug Policy Foundation -
Soros $." The last references are to a
reform group and billionaire
financier George Soros, a major financial
backer of medical use
initiatives.
A second participant, who requested anonymity, told Salon,
"People were
talking of Soros money at the meeting. That was a real topic,
and that
there was limited federal money that could be used. We were trying
to
counter the California and Arizona initiatives. But at that point there
was
no money." Eleven months later, a five-year, $2 billion (half public,
half
private) federal campaign was instituted to shape the views of
Americans of
all ages regarding illegal drugs.
Asked two weeks ago
whether the intent was to limit further state
initiatives to approve usage
of medical marijuana, another participant who
asked not to be identified
said, "Yes. They wanted to influence public
opinion. There was a lot of talk
that this was the tip of the iceberg of a
national campaign to legalize
marijuana, period."
But White House deputy press secretary Jake Siewert
says, "The switch to
the paid media campaign was driven entirely by the
decision to move to
curtail drug use. In fact, ONDCP is specifically
prohibited from using
political messages in paid advertising." Confronted
with Jellinek's
statement about the "Feds going against the will of the
people," Siewert
said, "I don't understand it." But Siewert did caution that
"The ONDCP is
prohibited from involving itself in political causes in its
advertising."
When asked whether the meeting was intended to roll back the
California and
Arizona initiatives, Siewert stated, "Ask
McCaffrey."
A public statement released by McCaffrey on December 30,
1996, refers to
the meeting and states that the "coordinated administration
strategy" was
developed by the group "at the direction of the
president."
When McCaffrey was deposed for the California doctors'
lawsuit on May 23,
2000, he stated that the November 1996 meeting "was an
organizational
meeting to sort out what are we going to do about Proposition
215." In
response to another deposition question, he replied, "It wasn't an
open
debate. It was what are we going to do about the
proposition."
McCaffrey's role in fighting medical marijuana has been
multifaceted. Until
1999, the federal government only permitted research on
the health benefits
of the drug using limited grants from the National
Institutes of Health,
which effectively put the lid on such proposals. But
last year, the Clinton
administration said it would sell limited quantities
of government-grown
pot to legitimate medical researchers, who could then
secure financing from
sources other than the NIH. The move came only after a
report by the
National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine confirmed
some
healthful benefits of marijuana -- a study McCaffrey tried to
downplay.
But researchers seeking to study the medical merits of smoking
marijuana
still find themselves frozen out. Dr. Ethan B. Russo, a
neurologist and
clinical assistant professor at the University of Washington
School of
Medicine, has been trying for years to gain approval to study the
effectiveness of smoked marijuana as a treatment for chronic migraines.
"After the Institute of Medicine report came out in 1999, they said they
would streamline the process. But it hasn't happened; the process is every
bit as difficult as before. It's smoke and mirrors." McCaffrey has even
threatened legal action against California Attorney General Bill Lockyer if
he promoted medical marijuana research on the state level.
Following
the ONDCP-convened meeting, PDFA chairman James E. Burke moved to
take
action on his colleagues' sentiments, including their desire for
federal
money. Working closely with Rep. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, he began a
heavy
lobbying campaign in Congress to transform his organization's model
of
donated ads into the current taxpayer funded program. Portman's former
chief
of staff, John Bridgeland, told this reporter last year, "Burke came
to
Portman, came up and wowed a lot of folks on the Hill."
Rep. Jim Kolbe,
R-Ariz., chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee
which funds the drug
office, and the self-styled "chief appropriator" of
the ONDCP media
campaign, said last year, "We were convinced by the
Partnership for a
Drug-Free America to spend tax dollars." Finally,
testifying before the
Senate Appropriations Committee on February 3, 2000,
ONDCP campaign media
director Alan Levitt stated, "PDFA is a key campaign
partner. Mr. Jim Burke,
chairman of the Partnership, has been one of the
strongest advocates for
this public-private media campaign."
For its part, PDFA has said that the
public campaign was necessary because
privately donated advertising was
drying up. But while PDFA's donated
advertising declined in the early '90s,
it didn't exactly evaporate.
According to Competitive Media Reporting, a
company that tracks advertising
spending, the value of PDFA's anti-drug
campaign was larger than the
advertising budgets of many of the country's
most established brands. With
$278 million worth of donated advertising time
and space in 1995 and $252
million in 1996 (down from 1991's peak of $367
million), PDFA was the
fourth and fifth largest advertised "brand" in the
country -- competing
alongside companies like AT&T and Burger King for
the public's attention.
It should be acknowledged that the media campaign
has never directly
tackled the issue of medical marijuana in its paid
advertising. And yet
fully half of the current ONDCP advertising budget for
a campaign nominally
geared toward curtailing youth drug use is actually
directed at adults.
According to a statement issued on Jan. 18, in response
to a Salon article
about its anti-drug script-doctoring relationship with
television networks,
the "pro bono [sic] match component" of the ad program
has "generated over
100 million teen and tween [read: pubescent] impressions
and 250 million
adult impressions."
ONDCP's priorities would seem to
lie at least as much with influencing
adults -- who profoundly influence
kids' attitudes and behaviors, but also
vote -- as with steering children
away from drugs.
The November 1996 meeting took place immediately
following an election
season in which President Clinton had been slammed by
the Republicans as
being soft on drugs. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R.-Texas,
described the
administration as "drug coddling" during the 1996 Republican
convention, a
theme echoed by candidate Bob Dole.
Last month -- when
ONDCP was offered the chance to respond to a draft of a
congressionally
mandated, General Accounting Office analysis critical of
McCaffrey and the
drug office's management -- ONDCP chief of staff Janet
Crist wrote: "The
agency is very mindful of previous congressional
complaints that the
administration had been 'AWOL' in the area of drug
control early in its term
and determined to respond to constituent demands
that their extensive
efforts in the areas of prevention, treatment,
enforcement and interdiction
be publicly recognized."
But the October 1997 legislation that paved the
way for the paid media
campaign states that ONDCP must submit a strategy for
approval by both the
House and the Senate that includes "guidelines to
ensure and certify that
none of the funds will be used for partisan
political purposes." As their
statements quoted in this article suggest, the
participants discussed using
public monies for a media campaign to try to
defeat a specific political
viewpoint -- one that will be contested in the
upcoming elections in
Colorado and Nevada.
Medical use initiatives
have passed in six states: California, Arizona,
Alaska, Washington, Oregon
and Maine. A non-binding first initiative also
passed in Nevada, and an
initiative in Colorado was disqualified because
supporters hadn't gathered
enough signatures to get it on the ballot. Both
states will reconsider the
matter this year. Additionally, this past
spring, state legislators in
Hawaii voted to allow medical use.
When asked about her department's
participation in the meeting, Department
of Education spokesperson Melinda
Malico would say only that "General
McCaffrey sets drug policy for the
federal government. We participate in
many meetings over at ONDCP." The
Treasury and Health and Human Services
departments declined
comment.
However, in the statement he issued on Dec. 30, 1996, regarding
"the
administration's response" to the Arizona and California initiatives, a
response coming "at the direction of the president," McCaffrey noted that
the "interagency working group" met four times during November and December
1996. He also notes that "HHS and the Department of Education will educate
the public in both Arizona and California about the real and proven dangers
of smoking marijuana." But there was no discussion of the multimillion
dollar anti-drug media campaign ONDCP was developing with the assistance of
HHS -- and the PDFA.
Not surprisingly, ONDCP critics were dismayed to
hear of the meeting. Steve
Kubby, California's Libertarian Party candidate
for governor in 1998,
decried a meeting involving "public officials on the
public payroll in a
public facility conspiring to commit actions to
undermine an election." The
medical marijuana advocate is undergoing
prosecution for alleged marijuana
possession with the intent to sell, but he
recently told the Los Angeles
Times he was just using marijuana to combat
the effects of adrenal cancer.
Another campaign critic, Sanho Tree,
director of the Drug Policy Project at
the Institute for Policy Studies,
observed that Rep. Mica has held hearings
on the lobbying efforts of
nonprofit drug reform groups. "Rep. Bob Barr
[R-Ga.] even wanted to
prosecute [reform] advocates under the RICO laws.
Does this mean the
Republican drug warriors will investigate the lobbying
activities of
PDFA?"
Adds Kevin B. Zeese, president of Common Sense for Drug Policy,
"We see one
more example of the drug war going too far, putting the drug war
ahead of
democracy. In reality, the drug czar is ginning up support through
a phony
grass-roots effort."
Website: http://www.salon.com/
Author: Danial
Forbes
Note: Daniel Forbes is a New York freelancer who writes on social
policy
and the media.
Bookmark: MAP's link to ONDCP Media Campaign
items:
http://www.mapinc.org/campaign.htm
See:
also http://www.pdfa.net/ another
MAP/DrugSense website.
Cited: Steve Kubby: http://www.drugsense.org/amma/
Kevin
Zeese: http://www.csdp.org/
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